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Personal Choice and Civil Code Section 1714.45:
An Epilogue for California's Smoking and Health
Litigationt
MARTIN R. GLICK*
H. JOSEPH ESCHER III**
INTRODUCTION
At their peak in December 1986, forty-nine smoking and health
lawsuits had been served, and thirty-five were pending against to-
bacco company defendants in California. Since that time, no Cali-
fornia case has gone to trial, and the number of the served and
pending cases has declined to sixteen. Only one plaintiffs' counsel
is still involved in the litigation. At the time of this writing, a
motion for judgment on the pleading governing all of the sixteen
pending cases has just been granted by the appellate court in
American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court.1 No additional smoking
and health lawsuits have been served on the tobacco defendants in
California since the passage of Civil Code section 1714.45 in Sep-
tember 1987. The explanation for the virtual extinction of the
much-heralded "new wave" of smoking and health litigation in
California2 is straightforward: the immunity declared by Civil
Code section 1714.45, and the eviscerating effect of the preemp-
tion and "personal choice" defenses on plaintiffs' core theories of
recovery.
The authors of The "New" Wave In Smoking and Health Liti-
gation-Is Anything Really So New? (Tennessee Article)3 recog-
t Martin R. Glick and H. Joseph Escher III are members of the law firm of
Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Robertson & Falk, which serves as counsel to R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Company in California smoking and health cases. The views expressed
herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Howard, Rice or
R.J. Reynolds.
* Martin R. Glick-J.D., Ohio State University (1964); B.A., (1961).
** H. Joseph Escher III-J.D., University of Chicago (1977); B.A., Stanford Univer-
sity (1974).
1. 89 C.D.A.S. 893 (Feb. 6, 1989).
2. The national trend is also strongly in the direction of a declining number of both
new and pending actions. Nearly 70 new actions were served on tobacco companies at the
beginning of 1986, with only one new action filed in the six months since the verdict in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 83-2964 (D.N.J. 1988). See CRUDELE, The Smoke
Clears, N.Y. MAGAZINE, Nov. 14, 1988 at 28 (describing other dismissals by plaintiffs'
counsel).
3. Crist & Majoras, The "New" Wave in Smoking and Health Litigation-Is Any-
thing Really So New?, 54 TENN. L. REv. 551 (1987).
? ???? ?????
Citation: 25 Cal. W. L. Rev. 239 1988-1989 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://hei online.org)
Wed Jul  1 14:38:32 2015
-- Your use f this HeinOnli e PDF indicates your acceptance
   f HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=g &searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0008-1639
1
Glick and Escher III: Personal Choice and Civil Coe Section 1714:45:  An Epilogue for C
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
nized that the "new wave" of tobacco litigation would founder, as
had the earlier cases, on general public awareness of the alleged
risks of smoking, and personal choice and responsibility. This Ar-
ticle will not restate the Tennessee Article's detailed analyses of
the historical public awareness of alleged risks associated with
smoking, and the preemptive effect of the congressionally-man-
dated warnings since 1966. Rather, this Article focuses on the ef-
fect of California's recently enacted Civil Code section 1714.45,4
the assumption of risk defense in California, and the recent na-
tional developments in the smoking and health litigation, espe-
cially the three cases5 which have been tried by juries since publi-
cation of the Tennessee Article. Before beginning the analysis of
California's comment i statute and recent developments, it is use-
ful to summarize the state of California law prior to the passage
of Civil Code section 1714.45, especially the defense of federal
preemption.
I. THE EFFECT OF PREEMPTION ON PLAINTIFFS' THEORIES
A. The Preemptive Effect of the Labeling Act
More than twenty-five federal and state courts-including all
California courts that have considered the issue since the Third
Circuit's 1986 decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 0-have held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Adver-
tising Act (Labeling Act)7 preempts most, if not all, of plaintiffs'
post-January 1, 1966 claims. Simply put, Congress declared that
the warnings mandated by the Labeling Act were adequate to in-
form consumers of "any relationship between smoking and
health," and preempted any state or federal effort to impose, inter
alia, different or additional warnings; or any different or addi-
tional obligations with respect to the advertising or promotion of
cigarettes. The conclusion that state common law product liability
actions were subject to preemption was first articulated by the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
in Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.8 and confirmed shortly
thereafter by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
4. Civ. Code § 1714.45 codifies the personal responsibility analysis of RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comments g & i (1964).
5. Horton v. American Tobacco Co., (Holmes County, Miss. 1988) (unreported
case); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 83-2864 (D.N.J.); Girton v. American To-
bacco Co., sub nom. Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
6. 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1342 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
8. 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), afid, 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988).
[Vol. 25
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CIVIL CODE SECTION 1714.45
Circuit in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.9 The Third Circuit's
holding in Cipollone is as follows:
[T]he Act preempts those state law damage actions relating to
smoking and health that challenge either the adequacy of the
warning on cigarette packages or the propriety of a party's ac-
tions with respect to the advertising and promotion of cigarettes.
We further hold that where the success of a state law damage
claim necessarily depends on the assertion that a party bore the
duty to provide a warning to consumers in addition to the warn-
ing Congress has required on cigarette packages, such claims
are preempted as conflicting with the Act.
The overwhelming weight of authority, both inside and outside of
California, has accepted the compelling logic of Roysdon and Ci-
pollone. Several courts have concluded that preemption eliminates
all of plaintiffs' post-January 1, 1966 claims,10 and several other
cases have been dismissed in the wake of complaints gutted by
preemption rulings.
B. Plaintiffs' Theories and the Scope of Preemption
1. Strict Liability/Failure to Warn Theory-Plaintiffs' central
theory of liability prior to Cipollone was strict liability/failure to
warn. After Cipollone, any such post-1965 claim is clearly pre-
empted. Pre-1966 failure to warn claims present their own obvious
problems, and do not escape unaffected by the same principles un-
derlying the preemption rulings. The first problem involves pre-
1966 common knowledge as to the alleged dangers of smoking. As
described at length in the Tennessee Article, the Advisory Com-
mittee's Report to the Surgeon General in 1964 and the warnings
(which have appeared on all cigarette packages since January 1,
1966) were hardly the first news Americans had received as to the
claimed harmful effects of smoking.11 Reports of risks of smoking
have been pervasive in every form of communication throughout
the century, and indisputably throughout the entire smoking his-
tory of the smokers in the "new wave" of smoking and health liti-
9. 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W. 2d 691 (Minn. App. 1988), appeal
accepted No. C-87-2170 (Minn. Sup. Ct. filed May 27, 1988). Forster is the only pub-
lished opinion decided after the Third Circuit decision in Cipollone which finds that the
Labeling Act does not preempt state common law claims. In Forster, the state intermediate
court of appeals relied on the reversed trial court opinion of Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984). The Forster decision is currently on appeal to the Min-
nesota Supreme Court.
10. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187. See, e.g., Sahli v. Manville Corp., No. 230512 (Cal.
Super. Ct. filed May 14, 1987).
11. See, e.g., Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343, 348 (1900) (in which the United
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gation. Indeed, comment i to section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, drafted in 1962, specifically acknowledges the
widespread and common knowledge of risks attributed to smoking.
This widespread awareness defeats strict liability as a matter of
law, and also defeats as a matter of fact any possible causal con-
nection between plaintiffs' injury and any pre-1966 "failure to
warn."
12
In addition, plaintiffs face two other severe and perhaps insur-
mountable burdens in proving a causal relationship between a pre-
1966 "failure to warn" and the development of disease over
twenty years later. First, having ignored warnings adequate as a
matter of federal law for more than twenty years, plaintiffs will
have trouble convincing anyone that a pre-1966 warning would
have been heeded. 13 Plaintiffs' only possible response is to contend
that their alleged "addiction" to smoking precluded cessation in
1966.14 The fact that more than forty million Americans have vol-
untarily stopped smoking since 196515 is a very convincing factual
rejoinder to this "addiction" counterargument. Furthermore, the
"addiction" argument is self-defeating for plaintiffs' theories of
recovery because it implies that the smoker tried to quit before
1966 (most likely due to health concerns attributable to actual
awareness of reported risks), and that any pre-1966 warning
would not have affected the smoker's behavior. 16
Second, plaintiffs face a major challenge in attempting to prove
that pre-1966 smoking, allegedly tainted by a failure to warn, ei-
ther "caused" or was a substantial contributing cause of a con-
temporary injury. Epidemiological evidence-extensively relied on
by plaintiffs in an attempt to prove that cigarette smoking
"causes" disease-is also self-defeating because it indicates that if
the smoker had ceased smoking in 1966, any statistically inferred
12. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1964). Com-
ment j provides that there is no duty to warn of commonly known dangers, including those
from consumption of a product over a long period of time, using alcohol and foods with
saturated fats as examples. Alcohol, butter and sugar are also used as examples in com-
ment i. E.g., Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1982) (dismissing product
liability action against vodka manufacturer noting that both comments i and j deal with
products which are not unreasonably unsafe because of the common knowledge of their
dangers). See generally Crist & Majoras, supra note 3, at 595-96.
13. See, e.g., Girton v. American Tobacco Co., sub. nom. Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp.,
674 F, Supp. 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1987) discussed infra at notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
14. Any claim that "addiction" negated the effectiveness of the statutory warning
required by the Labeling Act post-1965 is preempted. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
649 F. Supp. 664, 674 (D.N.J. 1986) (on remand).
15. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SMOKING
AND HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 466 (1987).
16. See infra notes 100-25 and accompanying text which discusses the legal insuffi-
ciency of the "addiction" counterargument.
[Vol. 25
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CIVIL CODE SECTION 1714.45
risk essentially returns to that of the general population within
fifteen years, long before any illness at issue developed. 17 Thus, as
a general rule, plaintiffs' central theory-strict liability/failure to
warn-has been defeated by the scope of preemption announced
in Cipollone.
2. Strict Liability/Design Defect Theory-Following Cipollone,
California plaintiffs retreated to a strict liability/design defect
theory of liability. Plaintiffs appeared to intend to proceed on both
the "consumer expectations" and "risk-benefit" prongs of the test
for design defects announced in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.18
They immediately encountered insurmountable hurdles. First, one
cannot argue that a product is more dangerous than an adequately
warned consumer would expect, and thus the "consumer expecta-
tions" test of liability is clearly preempted for post-1965 smok-
ing.19 Second, Congress determined that consumers adequately
warned pursuant to the Labeling Act should have the right to de-
cide whether or not to smoke. Assuming arguendo the applicabil-
ity of the risk-benefit prong of Barker's design defect test to ciga-
rettes as a product, the Labeling Act should be found to preempt
any effort to reweigh the congressionally-drawn balance of inter-
ests.20 Indeed, as recognized in Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.,2"
one of the purposes of the Labeling Act was to protect commerce
in tobacco to the "maximum extent" consistent with the informa-
tional goals of the warnings. Plaintiffs cannot argue that the risks
of cigarettes outweigh their benefits without arguing that the con-
gressional balancing of interests was improper. Finally, this "ge-
neric" approach to risk-benefit analysis is inconsistent with the re-
quirements of California design defect law.2"
17. See, e.g., PUBLIC HEALTH SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUIAN SERVS.,
SMOKING AND HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL viii (1982) ("fifteen years
after quitting cigarette smoking, the former smoker's lung cancer risk, for example, is re-
duced close to that observed in nonsmokers").
18. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
19. See, e.g., Sahli v. Manville Corp., No. 230512, slip op. at 2. (Cal. Super. Ct.
May 14, 1987) ("Ito the extent that the remaining allegations assert a claim for design
defect under the consumer expectations test, the claim is preempted by the Act for sales
after 1965 because such a claim depends directly upon the allegations that the federally
mandated warning fails adequately to inform consumers of the health risks of cigarettes").
See generally Crist & Majoras, supra note 3, at 577-78.
20. See, e.g., Sahli v. Manville Corp., No. 230512 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 14, 1987)
("[tlo the extent that the remaining allegations assert a claim for design defect under the
risk-benefit test, the claim is preempted by the Act for sales after 1965 because, in alleging
that cigarettes are defective solely because they carry risks to health plaintiff seeks to have
a jury reweigh the regulatory balance of the interests arrived at by Congress in the Act").
See generally Kelso, Brown v. Abbott Laboratories and Strict Products Liability, 20 PAC.
L.J. 1, 21 (1988).
21. 825 F.2d 620 (Ist Cir. 1987).
22. See generally Crist & Majoras, supra note 3, at 578-82; James, The Untoward
1989]
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3. Negligence Theories-Plaintiffs' negligence theories closely
parallel their strict liability causes of action. 3 The preemption
analysis for negligence also closely parallels that of strict liability.
Thus, post-1965 negligent failure to warn claims are clearly pre-
empted under Cipollone, and pre-1966 negligent failure to warn
claims suffer from the same difficulties as pre-1966 strict liability/
failure to warn claims. Plaintiffs' claims of negligent design also
encounter the same preemption problems as the strict liability/
design defect claims. In order to have a negligent design, there
must be a design alternative and a negligent design cause of ac-
tion cannot be turned into an analysis of whether it was unreason-
able to sell cigarettes at all-that is inconsistent with the scope of
preemption in Cipollone and with California product liability law
generally. 24 Plaintiffs' potpourri of other allegations of negligence
(negligent advertising, promotion, sale, failure to test, etc.) are no
more than subcategories of negligent failure to warn and design
defect claims already discussed. Under Cipollone and its progeny,
any post-1965 claim which depends upon an allegation of insuffi-
cient warning, or advertising and promotion, is preempted, and a
generic "risk-benefit" condemnation of cigarettes is insupportable
under California product liability law and the Labeling Act.
The complaints in the California litigation also contain allega-
tions (now routine in product liability cases), of fraud and "con-
spiracy." Since it is logically inconsistent to allege a conspiracy to
commit negligent acts, the theory typically alleged is one to mis-
represent or "suppress" information regarding the alleged dangers
of smoking. On remand, the district court in Cipollone held that
such a post-1965 conspiracy claim was clearly preempted under
the Third Circuit's analysis in Cipollone. Although the pre-1966
conspiracy claims survived a Cipollone dismissal, those claims
faced very serious factual difficulties, including their inherent im-
probability in the face of widespread public awareness and causa-
tion problems,25 and they were flatly rejected by the Cipollone
jury.
4. Breach of Implied Warranty Theory-The final theory rou-
tinely pleaded in the California complaints is breach of implied
warranty. Virtually all of such allegations have been dismissed
Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflections on Enterprise Liability, 54 CALIF. L.
REv. 1550, 1553 (1966). See discussion infra at notes 36-56 and accompanying text.
23. See generally Kelso, supra note 20 (analyzing "strict" products liability, espe-
cially design defect, as a form of negligence law).
24. See Sahli v. Manville Corp., No. 230512 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 14, 1987); Kelso,
supra note 20, at 21.
25. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 25
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CIVIL CODE SECTION 1714.45
pursuant to demurrer for failure (and inability) to allege privity
between the smoker and the manufacturer.26 In any event, all
post-1965 implied warranty theories would be crippled by the ex-
press disclaimer of the implied warranty as set out in the congres-
sionally-mandated warnings,2 7 as well as an inability to prove
reliance.
In conclusion, plaintiffs' complaints after the application of pre-
emption under Cipollone are only shadows of their original allega-
tions. Even without Civil Code section 1714.45's recognition of the
application of comment i to tobacco in California, plaintiffs were
faced with attempting to establish highly problematic causation
on, at best, truly marginal theories of liability. The immunity de-
clared by Civil Code section 1714.45 eliminates any remaining
window of opportunity to reach a jury with a claim that liability
should attach to the manufacture or sale of tobacco products.
II. CIVIL CODE SECTION 1714.45 AND COMMENT i
A. California Law Prior to Civil Code Section 1714.45
California pioneered the development and exposition of strict
products liability, and initially embraced the American Law Insti-
tute's articulation of that doctrine as set forth in Restatement sec-
tion 402A and its comments.28 However, prior to the passage of
the Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987, no California decision had
expressly addressed a manufacturer's liability for common con-
sumer products like tobacco, alcoholic beverages, butter or sugar.
Nonetheless, Civil Code section 1714.45 represents an accurate
articulation of preexisting law. Under Section 402A, strict liabil-
ity is imposed for products which are in a "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous."29 The term "defective condition" is de-
26. See Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 114 n.8, 534 P.2d 377, 383 n.8, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 681, 687 n.8 (1975).
27. See id. at 118-20, 534 P.2d at 386-87, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 690-91; CAL. COM.
CODE § 2316 (Deering 1986).
28. See generally Kelso, supra note 20, at 10-15.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964) provides as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
1989]
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fined in comment g to Section 402A,30 and the term "unreasona-
bly dangerous" is explained in comment i. In both cases, the fram-
ers declared their intent not to include common consumer
products such as tobacco and alcoholic beverages in the scope of
strict liability. Comment i specifically provides:
i. Unreasonably dangerous. The rule stated in this Section ap-
plies only where the defective condition of the product makes it
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. Many products
cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and
any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only
from over-consumption. Ordinary sugar is a deadly poison to
diabetics, and castor oil found use under Mussolini as an instru-
ment of torture. That is not what is meant by "unreasonably
dangerous" in this Section. The article sold must be dangerous
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowl-
edge common to the community as to its characteristics. Good
whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will
make some people drunk, and is especially dangerous to al-
coholics; but bad whiskey, containing a dangerous amount of fu-
sel oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco is not unreason-
ably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be
harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may
be unreasonably dangerous. Good butter is not unreasonably
dangerous merely because, if such be the case, it deposits choles-
terol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks; but bad butter,
contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably
dangerous.31
Given the widespread awareness of health risks commonly be-
lieved to be inherent in the use of such products as tobacco, alco-
hol, and foods high in saturated fats, comment i concludes that
these products are not "unreasonably dangerous." The drafters of
comment i reasoned that consumers should be free to choose to
consume those products, and manufacturers free to sell them,
without imposition of liability. Indeed, to make this point more
explicitly, the framers added the "defective" requirement to fore-
close liability for such products. 32
30. Id. Comment g provides in relevant part that "[t]he rule stated in this Section
applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not
contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." It
is important to note that the consumer expectations concept is central to this definition of
"defect."
31. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i.
32. In the meetings of the American Law Institute in 1961, where Section 402A was
debated, Dean Prosser (the Reporter for the Restatement) stated that the word "defective"
was added to the section to make it clear that products with commonly perceived inherent
risks, like alcohol and tobacco, were not considered to be the subject of strict liability:
The Council then proceeded to raise the question of a number of products which,
even though not defective, are in fact dangerous to the consumer-whiskey, for
[Vol. 25
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In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Co.,3" the California Supreme Court
acknowledged that California tort law had generally accepted
Section 402A of the Restatement, including comment i. However,
the court in Cronin noted that Section 402A's term "unreasonably
dangerous" was confusing and ambiguous, and appeared to inject
a notion of negligence ("unreasonable") which strict liability had
been developed to eliminate: "[the unreasonably dangerous re-
quirement] has burdened the injured plaintiff with proof of an ele-
ment which rings of negligence."' 4 To avoid this confusion, the
Cronin court eliminated the "unreasonably dangerous" language
from Section 402A's articulation of strict liability, but retained
the "defect" requirement.3 The Cronin court did not, however,
abandon the rule and rationale of nonliability for common con-
sumer products which meet consumer expectations, within the
example [laughter]; cigarettes, which cause lung cancer; various types of drugs
which can be administered with safety up to a point but may be dangerous if
carried beyond that-and they raised the question whether "unreasonably danger-
ous" was sufficient to protect the defendant against possible liability in such cases.
Therefore, they suggested that there [sic] something must be wrong with the
product itself, and hence the word "defective" was put in; but the fact that the
product itself is dangerous, or even unreasonably dangerous, to people who con-
sume it is not enough. There has to be something wrong with the product.
38th Annual Meeting of the American Lav Institute Proceedings 87-88 (1961) (emphasis
added). See also Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825, 830 (1973).
Early drafts of the comments to Section 402A clearly establish that comment i was
intended to clarify the fact that the principles of strict liability did not apply to tobacco
products. In the 1961 draft, the basic substance of current comment i was contained in
former comment f, but with an important difference: former comment f did not contain a
reference to alcohol or tobacco products. Former comment f read, in part:
f. Unreasonably dangerous. The rule stated in this Section applies only where the
defective condition of the food makes it unreasonably dangerous to the consumer.
Many products cannot be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any food or
drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from overconsumption. Ordi-
nary sugar is a deadly poison to diabetics, and castor oil found use in Italy as an
instrument of torture. That is not what is meant by "unreasonably dangerous" in
this Section. The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, without spe-
cial knowledge of its characteristics.
37th Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute Proceedings 37 (1961).
When the reach of Section 402A was extended beyond food in 1962, comment f was
redrafted. The new comment--comment i-made specific reference to the very products
(alcohol and tobacco) that Dean Prosser had identified as not defective and not subject to
liability in his statement to the American Law Institute in 1961. Comment i expressed the
drafters' intent that certain products which "cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all
consumption" were not to be actionable under Section 402A. Comment i clearly estab-
lished that tobacco products such as cigarettes were not considered to be "defective" or
"unreasonably dangerous" within the meaning of Section 402A.
33. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
34. Id. at 132, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441. Cf. Keeton, Product Liabil-
ity and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 32 (1973) ("the term 'unreasonably
dangerous' was meant only as a definition of defect.").
35. See generally Kelso, supra note 20.
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meaning of both comments g and i.
Nor did the court's landmark decision in Barker v. Lull Engi-
neering Co.3" change that result. After reiterating its adherence to
the standard established in Cronin, the Barker court went on to
consider the definition of "defect" in products liability cases.
Barker is best known for its articulation of two alternative tests
for liability in typical products liability cases:
[A] product is defective in design either (1) if the product has
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would ex-
pect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable man-
ner, or (2) if, in light of the relevant factors ... the benefits of
the challenged design do not outweigh the risk of danger inher-
ent in such design.37
The Barker court then reviewed and summarized prior cases as
falling into two distinct categories. First, "a product may be found
defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect
when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. '38
This standard is analogous to an implied warranty theory39 and
tracks the language found in comments g and i to section 402A.
The court noted that such a standard is insufficient in situations
where the design of the product embodies excessive preventable
danger, because consumers might have no idea how safe the prod-
uct could be made. 40 The Barker court therefore adopted a second
standard, holding that:
[A] product may be found defective in design, even if it satisfies
ordinary consumer expectations, if through hindsight the jury
determines that the product's design embodies "excessive pre-
ventable danger," or, in other words, if the jury finds that the
risk of danger inherent in the challenged design outweighs the
benefits of such design.4'
In this alternative design context, the court concluded that the
jury should consider the following factors in applying the risk-ben-
efit test to a challenged design feature of a product:
[T]he gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the
likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasi-
bility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an im-
proved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and
to the consumer that would result from an alternative design.42
36. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
37. Id. at 418, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
38. Id. at 429, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
39. Id. at 429-30, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
40. Id. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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It is logical to conclude, albeit arguably somewhat unclear from
the opinion in Barker, that in the absence of proof that a feasible
alternative design existed and would have prevented the injury,
plaintiff is not entitled to a risk-utility instruction.43 Proof that a
product, rather than the product's design, caused the injury is le-
gally insufficient. A plaintiff should be required to make a prima
facie showing that the injury was proximately caused by a specific
design feature of the product, and that an alternative design for
the product was available which would have prevented the injury.
This proximate cause analysis was at the heart of the district
court's directed verdict for defendants on the "alternative design"
claim in Cipollone.
At least one California case has implicitly addressed this issue
of the requirement of an alternative design. In Garcia v. Joseph
Vince Co.,44 plaintiff sustained an eye injury in a fencing match
when his opponent's saber penetrated his mask. Plaintiff sued the
saber and mask manufacturers on the theory of strict liability. As
to the claim against the mask manufacturer, the court noted that
there was no evidence that the manufacturer could have designed
a mask that would not have been penetrated by the defectively
sharp and pointed saber that injured plaintiff.4 The court held
that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of a design defect
to go to the jury, and granted a nonsuit in favor of defendant:
No testimony was adduced by plaintiff that a fencing mask ei-
ther exists or can be designed which will prevent penetration by
a sharp-edged saber. To the contrary the unrebutted testimony
was that any mask can be penetrated by a sharp-edged saber.
Plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the state-of-the-art
or existing technology is capable of perfecting a mask which
cannot be penetrated by a sharp-edged saber.4
Because plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of alternative
mask designs which would have prevented his injury, the Garcia
court refused to impose strict liability under either prong of
Barker's design defect test: "[s]imply because fencing masks can-
not be made absolutely safe against all risks does not make a
manufacturer liable for placing them on the market." 47
The focus in Garcia on the requirement of a design alternative
was addressed in a more tangential fashion in Campbell v. Gen-
43. See generally Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1062 (1988) ("Barker
contemplates a safer alternative design is possible. ... )
44. 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1978).
45. Id. at 879, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 879, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 850. See id. at 878, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 849 (citing
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eral Motors Corp.48 In Campbell, plaintiff was sitting on a side-
facing bus seat, when an abrupt turn caused her to lose her bal-
ance and fall. In front of each of the forward-facing seats on the
bus was a "grab bar" mounted on the back of the forward-facing
seat immediately ahead. Because plaintiff's side-facing seat did
not face the back of another seat there was no grab bar in front of
her. At trial plaintiff contended that the bus should have been
designed to place a guard rail within her reach. The trial court
granted a nonsuit, apparently reasoning that insufficient evidence
was presented to demonstrate that such a guard rail would have
prevented her fall. The California Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that:
[P]laintiff produced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case of causation. The evidence justified a conclusion that a de-
sign feature of the bus-the absence of a restraining bar or
pole-was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Under the
second prong of Barker, plaintiff discharged her evidentiary bur-
den. At this point, the burden of proof should have shifted to
defendant to offer evidence relevant to a risk-benefit evaluation
of the design of the bus.4 9
It seems clear from the California Supreme Court's opinion in
Campbell that had plaintiff failed to present evidence regarding
the feasibility of an additional guard rail, the nonsuit would have
been proper. This impression is reinforced by the court's approv-
ing quotation of Dean Prosser's formulation of the question before
a jury in an ordinary tort case: "'what would have happened if
[the product had been] otherwise.' "50 Presumably, if plaintiff had
not shown that the product could have been otherwise, plaintiff
would not have carried her burden of proof. Although Garcia and
Campbell appear to stand for the proposition that the availability
of a risk-utility instruction turns on proof of a feasible design al-
ternative, Barker explicitly did not decide this issue, and accord-
ingly left some ambiguity as to the status of this requirement in
California products liability law. In Barker's footnote 10, modify-
ing a sentence regarding "excessive preventable danger," the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court commented that this case presented the
court "no occasion to determine whether a product which entails a
substantial risk of harm may be found defective even if no safer
alternative design is feasible."'1  Nor has any subsequent case
presented such an opportunity generally, or specifically with re-
48. 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982).
49. Id. at 126, 649 P.2d at 232, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
50. Id. at 120, 649 P.2d at 228, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 895 (quoting Prosser, Proximate
Cause in California, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 369, 382 (1950) (interpolation in original)).
51. 20 Cal. 3d at 430 n.10, 573 P.2d at 455 n.10, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237 n.10.
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spect to the kinds of products referred to in comment i as to which
reported risks are well known. The status of Barker footnote 10 as
a disclaimer in dicta aside, no reported California decision since
Barker or before passage of Civil Code section 1714.45 imposed
design defect/risk-benefit strict liability on the manufacturer of a
product without a showing of an alternative design.
On the other hand, lower courts have addressed the Barker is-
sues with respect to common consumer products like those men-
tioned in comment i. In Galbraith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co.,5 12 the trial court refused plaintiffs' request for a risk-benefit
instruction in a smoking and health case. Similarly, in Bojorquez
v. House of Toys, Inc.,53 the Court of Appeal addressed the issue
of liability for another common product (slingshots), the risks of
which were commonly perceived. Implicitly declining Barker's in-
vitation to consider liability for products (like slingshots) whose
"norm is danger," the Bojorquez court essentially followed the
reasoning of comment j in holding that a slingshot sold without a
warning was not defective, anecdotally indicating that "common
knowledge" of these inherent dangers has existed "[e]ver since
David slew Goliath. 5 4
Subsequent to the passage of Civil Code section 1714.45, the
California Supreme Court unambiguously embraced Restatement
comment k in Brown v. Superior Court.55 Brown involved a pre-
scription drug (DES), and clarified the post-Barker uncertainty as
to California's acceptance of comment k's exclusion of prescrip-
tion drugs from certain types of strict liability. Although the pol-
icy rationales for the exclusion of comment i products and com-
ment k products are somewhat different, Brown and Civil Code
section 1714.45 demonstrate that California law embraces the ex-
clusions from strict liability set out in the comments to Restate-
ment Section 402A, despite the rejection of Section 402A's "un-
reasonably dangerous" language in Cronin, and the two-prong
design defect test in dicta in Barker. Thus, Brown declares and
clarifies the application of comment k in California in the same
way that Civil Code section 1714.45 explicitly declares the appli-
cation of comment i.
Prior to the passage of Civil Code section 1714.45, California
law had not rejected the content of comment i, only the vocabu-
lary "unreasonably dangerous" of Restatement section 402A. The
52. No. 144417 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 1985).
53. 62 Cal. App. 3d 930, 133 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1976).
54. Id. at 932-34, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 483-85.
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Garcia and Bojorquez cases implicitly or explicitly recognized the
lack of liability for products without alternative designs, empha-
sizing that the dangers of the products in those cases were well
known, and within the expectations of the common consumer.
However, no reported California case had separately addressed
the status of comment i's rule of nonliability for common con-
sumer products with commonly perceived inherent risks, such as
alcohol, sugar or tobacco. The passage of Civil Code section
1714.45 made it clear that comment i is the law of California.56
B. The Statutory Language and Interpretation of Civil Code
Section 1714.45
Civil Code section 1714.45 was part of the "historic compro-
mise" of the Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987 (the Act), and as
a small part of that tort reform package, was subject to eleventh-
hour negotiated compromise and consideration. The actual lan-
guage of California's "comment i" statute is as follows:
(a) In a product liability action, a manufacturer or seller shall
not be liable if:
(1) The product is inherently unsafe and the product is known
to be unsafe by the ordinary consumer who consumes the prod-
uct with the ordinary knowledge common to the community; and
(2) The product is a common consumer product intended for
personal consumption, such as sugar, castor oil, alcohol, tobacco,
and butter, as identified in comment i to Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.(b) For purposes of this section, the term "product liability
action" means any action for injury or death caused by a prod-
uct, except that the term does not include an action based on a
manufacturing defect or breach of an express warranty.
(c) This section is intended to be declarative of and does not
alter or amend existing California law, including Cronin v.
J.B.E. Olson Corp. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 121, and shall apply to all
product liability actions pending on, or commenced after, Janu-
ary 1, 1988.
Although the organization of Civil Code section 1714.45 is
somewhat awkward,57 the legislative intent is clear. The statutory
language of subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) closely tracks comments
g and i of Restatement section 402A. 58 In addition to paralleling
the analysis of comment i, Civil Code section 1714.45(a)(2)
makes explicit reference to the same products identified in Section
402A as being outside the scope of strict liability, but also makes
56. See infra notes 57-76 and accompanying text.
57. See American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court, 89 C.D.O.S. 893 (Feb. 6, 1989).
58. See supra notes 28-42 and accompanying text.
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explicit reference to comment i following the end of the statement
of the three-prong standard: "as identified in comment i to Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts." This statutory in-
corporation by reference of the analysis of the Restatement is un-
qualified, and follows the list of products "such as sugar, castor
oil, alcohol, tobacco, and butter" which are listed and discussed in
comment i. It is hornbook law that where a statute refers to a
secondary source, that source should be consulted in determining
legislative intent.5 9
The "legislative history" of Civil Code section 1714.45 also
demonstrates an intent to foreclose litigation over personal life
style choices involving the use of products like those identified in
subsection (a)(2). Thus, an analysis of Civil Code section 1714.45
prepared by a Legislative Committee consultant contemporane-
ously with its enactment pointed out that the statute "[c]odifies
appellate court decisions that products such as high-cholesterol
foods, alcohol, and cigarettes that are inherently unsafe and
known to be unsafe by ordinary consumers, are not to be subject
to product liability lawsuits."'6
There is a clear-cut and compelling analysis made contempora-
neously with the passage of the Act by the California Trial Law-
yers Association, the primary participant for plaintiffs' groups in
its drafting. That document, entitled "Intent of Major Provi-
sions," was specifically relied on by the court of appeal in Ameri-
can Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court61 and provides in relevant part
as follows:
This language was very carefully selected to insure that the im-
munity would only apply to the five specific products mentioned,
i.e., sugar, alcohol, tobacco, butter and castor oil, but also al-
lowing for the inclusion of some other product. The parties de-
cided against the word "only" to allow for the possibility of
some other product that appears on the market in the future and
possesses all of the necessary characteristics of these five prod-
ucts as those characteristics are identified in Section 402A.
Each of the five products is identified in Restatement Section
402A, Comment (i) as containing universally known dangers in-
herent in the product itself that are beyond further remedy or
removal. Each of those products is voluntarily and physically
consumed by the individual routinely despite the known inherent
dangers. All attempts to ban or regulate the sale or availability
of these products has [sic] been soundly rejected despite the con-
59. See generally CAL EViD. CODE § 450, Law Revision Commission Comments
(1965) (Deering 1986).
60. M. Redmond, Republican consultant to the Assembly Judiciary Committee,
Talking Point Explanation of S.B. 241 (Lockyer) (Sept. 24, 1987).
61. 89 C.D.O.S. 893, 894 (Feb. 6, 1989).
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demnation of the perils to one's health. This reflects society's
decision in favor of their availability.
Since the dangers cannot be further reduced, minimized or
alleviated without removing the product from the market, prod-
uct liability suits would only require or cause their removal. The
policy decision has already been made by society in favor of
their availability.
By restricting the immunity to (a) inherently unsafe products
and (b), intended for personal consumption such as alcohol,
sugar, tobacco, butter and castor oil as identified in Comment
(i) of 402A, it was intended and understood that the immunity
would apply to the five products identified.
As identified in 402A(i), these five products have certain dis-
tinct characteristics in consumption, societal acceptance and
known uncorrectable dangers.6 2
The context in which Civil Code section 1714.45 was enacted
further confirms that the legislature's intent was to eliminate ex-
isting tobacco product liability actions and to preclude future law-
suits relating to other "lifestyle" products such as alcoholic bever-
ages and rich foods. Indeed, the California tobacco products
liability lawsuits were the only "comment i" type lawsuits pending
in California, although alcoholic beverage product liability actions
have been brought in several states.6 3 The court in American To-
bacco Co. emphasized the importance of legislative context and
purpose in determining the intent of the legislature, and concluded
that the legislative context "strongly indicate[d] ' '6 4 an intention to
immunize tobacco and the other enumerated products.6 5
Section 1714.45 was passed by the Legislature against the
backdrop of tobacco trials in California, Tennessee, New Jersey
and elsewhere, as well as the fact that over thirty other tobacco
cases were pending in California, and had received widespread
publicity. Accordingly, Section 1714.45 specifically references
"pending" product liability actions, making clear that the statute
62. CALIFORNIA TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INTENT OF MAJOR PROVISIONS
(1987) (emphasis added).
63. See, e.g., Morris v. Adolph Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987);
Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1986); Pemberton v. American
Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1984); Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d
189 (7th Cir. 1982) (all dismissing product liability actions against alcoholic beverage
manufacturers on the ground that the risks of alcohol consumption are commonly known).
64, American Tobacco Co., 89 C.D.O.S. 893, 994 (Feb. 6, 1989).
65. "In construing a statute... [t]he court should take into account matters such as
context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of legisla-
tion upon the same subject, public policy, and contemporaneous construction." Alford v.
Pierno, 27 Cal. App. 3d 682, 688, 104 Cal. Rptr. 110, 114 (1972) (citing Estate of Jacob,
61 Cal. App. 2d 152, 155 (1943)); see also California Mfrs. Ass'n v. Public Util. Comm'n,
24 Cal. 3d 836, 844, 598 P.2d 836, 840-41, 157 Cal. Rptr. 676, 680 (1979) (explaining
that historical context is an important aspect of determining legislative purpose).
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shall apply to such cases.
The organizational structure of Civil Code section 1714.45 was
a subject of controversy after passage of the statute. One lower
court66 had concluded that the list of products ("sugar, castor oil,
alcohol, tobacco, and butter") and the explicit reference to com-
ment i ("as identified in comment i") could only mean that com-
ment i's analysis of nonliability for the listed products was in-
tended to be incorporated into Civil Code section 1714.45. In
other words, since comment i is precisely an analysis of nonliabil-
ity for common products for personal consumption with commonly
perceived and inherent dangers ("cannot be made entirely safe for
all consumption"), the statute's incorporation of comment i and
the enumerated products must be considered to be a declaration
that the enumerated products meet all three prongs of the nonlia-
bility standard.
The opposing argument, accepted by other superior courts prior
to reversal by the court of appeal in American Tobacco Co., em-
phasizes the placement of the reference to the enumerated prod-
ucts and comment i in Civil Code section 1714.45(a)(2). Accord-
ing to this analysis, the enumerated products are only examples of
"common consumer product[s] intended for personal consump-
tion," and not examples of products which are commonly known
to be inherently dangerous. Aside from relegating to mere coinci-
dence the fact that the enumerated products clearly meet common
perceptions as to the other two prongs of the statutory test,6 7 this
analysis fails to give any effect to the reference to comment i. Ac-
cordingly, this analysis runs afoul of the maxim of statutory con-
struction that effect should be given to all of the statutory lan-
guage.6 The court of appeal in American Tobacco Co. recognized
66. Hunyada v. Raymark Indus., No. 349090 (Sacramento Super. Ct. 1988).
67. Accord, Wade, supra note 32, at 842 ("[i]f a danger in the use of a particular
product is a matter of common knowledge and the public is fully aware of it and still freely
buys the product, then the product may well be found to be duly safe. Two common prod-
ucts where this may well be true today ... are liquor and the danger of alcoholism, and
cigarettes and the danger of lung cancer").
As the Legislature has declared, the alleged dangers of smoking are well-known and
recognized. For example, since 1909 the California statutes have contained provisions re-
quiring instruction on the alleged dangers of smoking: 1909 Cal. Stat. ch. 269 (repealed
1929); 1929 Cal. Stat. ch. 2 amended as 1943 Cal. Stat. ch. 71 amended as 1959 Cal. Stat.
ch. 2 amended as 1968 Cal. Stat. ch. 917 (repealed 1972); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 512.60
(Deering 1987 & Supp. 1988).
Further, since 1966, Congress has required that warnings of the alleged dangers of
smoking be placed on every pack of cigarettes sold in the United States. Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1342 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
68. Napa Valley Educators' Ass'n v. Napa Valley Unified School Dist., 194 Cal.
App. 3d 243, 248, 239 Cal. Rptr. 395, 397 (1987) (quoting California Teachers Ass'n v.
Governing Bd., 145 Cal. App. 3d 174, 179, 204 Cal. Rptr. 20, 23 (1983)) ("'effect should
be given to the statute as a whole, and to its every word and clause so that no part or
1989]
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that the reference to comment i is a reference to comment i's
analysis of tobacco as a consumer product with inherent dangers
which are commonly known: "[t]he reference to this language and
these same products in section 1714.45 would be entirely inappro-
priate if the legislative intendment was not to erode the enumer-
ated items from product liability on a rationale analogous to that
discussed in comment i . . . . "Thus, as a matter of both legisla-
tive intent and statutory construction, the enumerated products in
Civil Code section 1714.45(a)(2) are intended to be a declaration
that those products meet all three prongs of the statute's standard
for nonliability. 9
Civil Code section 1714.45(c) states that the statute is "declar-
ative of ... existing California law" and applies to pending cases.
Subsection (c) specifically references Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp.70 as being included in the existing law which has not been
altered by Civil Code section 1714.45. As discussed, comment i to
Restatement section 402A is entitled "Unreasonably dangerous"
and is in substance an analysis of certain products which are not
by definition unreasonably dangerous. 1 Cronin, on the other hand,
had rejected the "unreasonably dangerous" language of the strict
liability test, relying instead on "defect" language alone. However,
it is doubtful from both Cronin and Restatement section 402A
that the use of either of the two verbal articulations of the strict
liability standard makes any analytical (as opposed to procedural)
difference. The specific reference to Cronin in the "declarative of
existing law" provision of Civil Code section 1714.45(c) must
mean that the acceptance of comment i's analysis of no liability
for products which are "not unreasonably dangerous" was not
meant to be a wholesale reintroduction of the "unreasonably dan-
provision will become useless or meaningless, since it is presumed that every word and
provision was intended to have some meaning and function' "). See also Tabor v. Ulloa,
323 F.2d 823, 824 (9th Cir. 1963) ("legislature is presumed to have used no superfluous
words"). See generally Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 554 (1923) (Sutherland, J.)
(emphasizing the primacy of the canon of giving effect "to every part of a statute, if legiti-
mately possible"); accord 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
47.21 (4th ed. 1984).
69. See generally 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.18
(4th ed. 1984) (references to a qualifying class must be interpreted in light of germaneness
to the subject).
The fact that the descriptive clause "such as sugar ... alcohol, tobacco.. .." is separated
from the remainder of subsection (a)(2) by a comma is yet another reason to interpret that
clause as referring to all three prongs of § 1714.45's immunity standard. See id. § 47.33
("[e]vidence that a qualifying phrase is supposed to apply to all antecedents instead of only
to the immediately preceding one may be found in the fact that it is separated from the
antecedents by a comma.") (citing Board of Trustees v. Judge, 50 Cal. App. 3d 920, 926,
123 Cal. Rptr. 830, 834 (1975)).
70. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
71. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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gerous" prong of the strict liability test in Restatement section
402A into California strict liability law.72 Thus, consistent with
Cronin, California plaintiffs after Civil Code section 1714.45's ef-
fective date still do not need to demonstrate "unreasonable dan-
ger" in addition to "defect." However, Civil Code section 1714.45
does codify the conclusion reached in comment i that common
products for personal consumption with commonly perceived in-
herent risks do not give rise to liability. Indeed, this conclusion is
consistent with California law prior to the passage of Civil Code
section 1714.45, and with Cronin itself.L 3
The conclusion that comment i precludes liability for ordinary
cigarettes was recently affirmed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.74 The district
court had ordered a directed verdict for defendant on comment i
grounds. The preemption defense had resulted in the dismissal of
all failure to warn claims prior to trial. The Sixth Circuit first
affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's failure to warn
claims on preemption grounds, 5 agreeing with the Third Circuit
in Cipollone, and the First Circuit in Palmer. The Sixth Circuit
then addressed the comment i issue, noting that Tennessee law
provided for strict products liability if a product is defective or
unreasonably dangerous, even though Restatement section 402A
provides that both defect and unreasonable danger must be
shown. 6 The Sixth Circuit determined that the Camel and Win-
ston cigarettes smoked by plaintiff were not "defective," stressing
that "consumer knowledge about the risks inherent in the use of a
product is one factor to be considered when determining if a prod-
uct is defective." Although the Roysdon court observed that
"[t]he normal use of cigarettes is known by ordinary consumers to
72. See American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court, 89 C.D.O.S. 893, 894 (Feb. 6,
1989).
73. Cronin specifically addressed comment i to Restatement section 402A as part of
its analysis of the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement in both theory and practice. 8
Cal. 3d at 132, 501 P.2d at 1161, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443. Cronin appeared to note with
approval comment i's rejection of liability for comment i products like sugar and butter
because "such dangers are squarely within the contemplation of the ordinary consumer."
Nonetheless, Cronin rejected the practical effect of the "unreasonably dangerous" require-
ment in addition to "defect." But see American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court, 89
C.D.O.S. 893, 894 (Feb. 6, 1989) (noting in dicta that Section 1714.45 "creates an immu-
nity that cannot be conferred without altering . . . existing California law.").
74. 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988). The lower court's decision is reported at 623 F.
Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).
75. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1978). Although plaintiff had smoked prior to
1966, the Tennessee ten-year statute of repose limited proof to the ten years prior to the
commencement of the action in 1984.
76. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-105(a) (1978). The district court had noted that
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present grave health risks," that did not translate into a "flaw"
constituting a "defect," citing to a case involving alcoholic bever-
ages." Because there was no evidence that the cigarettes smoked
by plaintiff "present[ed] risks greater than those known to be as-
sociated with smoking," the jury could not conclude that the ciga-
rettes were "defective." Turning to the issue of unreasonable dan-
ger, the Roysdon court again emphasized consumer expectations,
and affirmed the district court's taking of "judicial notice" of the
common knowledge of the claimed dangers of smoking, and the
conclusion that there had been no showing by plaintiff of "unrea-
sonable danger."
Consistent with the legislative history of Civil Code section
1714.45, comment i, and pre-existing California law, the Califor-
nia Legislature clearly intended that Civil Code section 1714.45
declare a rule of nonliability for the products enumerated in the
statute and in comment i, including tobacco. The court of appeal
in American Tobacco Co. has now plainly affirmed this construc-
tion of Section 1714.45, declaring immunity for tobacco products.
1II. AssuMPTION OF RISK, SMOKING AND PERSONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
A. The Continued Viability of Implied Assumption of Risk as
a Complete Defense
Recent California case law developments affirm the viability of
implied assumption of risk as a complete defense separate from
and in addition to California's "pure" comparative fault system.
This assumption of risk defense should present an additional seri-
ous obstacle to plaintiffs in smoking and health actions, and is im-
plicit in the personal choice/personal responsibility policy embod-
ied in comment i and Civil Code section 1714.45.
The tobacco defendants' assumption of risk defense is that by
smoking cigarettes with knowledge of the claimed risks of smok-
ing, plaintiffs assumed those risks, and, as a result, are barred
from any recovery. Since January 1, 1966, all consumers have
been adequately warned as a matter of federal law of "any rela-
tionship between smoking and health," and must therefore be
deemed to have assumed such risks. As discussed in the Tennessee
Article, the risks of cigarette smoking were commonly appreciated
well before 1966. This complete defense of implied assumption of
risk is to be distinguished from a comparative fault analysis,
which only reduces plaintiff's recovery by a percentage of fault
77. Pemberton v. American Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1984).
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attributable to plaintiff.
In Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,78 the California Supreme Court re-
placed the all-or-nothing rule of contributory negligence with the
doctrine of pure comparative negligence. In the course of adopting
the rule of comparative negligence, the court discussed the effect
of comparative negligence on assumption of risk. The court first
noted that assumption of risk, as that doctrine had been applied in
California, encompasses conduct which might or might not involve
negligence by the plaintiff. Quoting Grey v. Fibreboard Paper
Products Co.," the court in Li reasoned that "where a plaintiff
unreasonably undertakes to encounter a specific known risk im-
posed by a defendant's negligence, the plaintiff's conduct ... is in
reality a form of contributory negligence."80 The second historical
form of assumption of risk also encompasses those situations
where a plaintiff is deemed to have agreed to relieve a defendant
of an obligation of reasonable conduct toward him. This situation
does not involve contributory negligence, but involves a reduction
of the defendant's duty of care. However, Li held that those par-
ticular cases in which the form of assumption of risk involved is
"merely a variant of the former doctrine of contributory negli-
gence," the assumption of risk defense is "to be subsumed under
the general process of assessing liability in proportion to
negligence." 8'
In assessing the effect of Li, it is helpful to examine the two
principal cases the California Supreme Court cited in its holding
regarding assumption of risk. In Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Prod-
ucts Co., the California Supreme Court noted that the term "as-
sumption of risk" had been used by courts to describe several
kinds of situations which demanded different kinds of treatment."2
In "simple" terms, the court distinguished between those situa-
tions where a plaintiff unreasonably undertakes to encounter a
specific known risk, and those situations where a plaintiff is held
to agree to relieve a defendant of an obligation of reasonable con-
duct toward him. The court held that only in the former situation
is there also contributory negligence. The latter situation does not
involve contributory negligence, but only a reduction of defend-
78. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
79. 65 Cal. 2d 240, 245, 418 P.2d 153, 156, 53 Cal. Rptr. 545, 548 (1966).
80. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 824, 532 P.2d at 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872. Prior to the
decision in Li, the conceptual distinctions between assumption of risk and contributory neg-
ligence were relatively unimportant as a practical matter, because both focused on plain-
tiff's conduct, and either would constitute a complete defense.
81. Id. at 829, 532 P.2d at 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
82. Grey, 65 Cal. 2d at 245, 418 P.2d at 156, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
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ant's duty of care.8 3
The court in Li also cited Fonseca v. County of Orange.4 In
Fonseca, the court discussed the nature of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk:
Assumption of risk involves the negation of defendant's duty;
contributory negligence is a defense to a breach of such duty;
assumption of risk may involve perfectly reasonable conduct on
plaintiff's part; contributory negligence never does; assumption
of risk typically embraces the voluntary or deliberate incurring
of known peril; contributory negligence frequently involves the
inadvertent failure to notice danger.8 5
The court in Fonseca went on to discuss the overlap between con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk, noting that a plain-
tiff's decision to encounter a known risk can itself be unreasonable
because the danger is out of all proportion to the advantage which
he is seeking to obtain, in which case the plaintiff's conduct could
be viewed as also a form of contributory negligence.86
Since Li, the California Supreme Court has not specifically ad-
dressed the viability of assumption of risk as a complete defense
where plaintiff's conduct is not merely a variant of contributory
negligence. However, the California Supreme Court has continued
implicitly to acknowledge that assumption of risk remains a com-
plete defense in appropriate circumstances. In Daly v. General
Motors Corp., 7 the court extended the application of comparative
negligence to strict liability causes of action. In so doing, it reaf-
firmed its holding in Li "that the defense of assumption of risk,
insofar as it is no more than a variant of contributory negligence,
was merged into the assessment of liability in proportion to
fault."8 8 Despite this opportunity to broaden the extent to which
comparative negligence eliminated the defense of assumption of
risk, the court repeatedly stated that assumption of risk was
merged into comparative negligence only to the extent that plain-
tiff's conduct amounts to negligence.89 This implied acknowledge-
ment of implied assumption of risk as a complete defense in situa-
tions which were not "mere variants" of comparative negligence
was perceived by certain appellate courts which articulated the
distinction as one between "duty" and negligence. 90
83. Id. at 245-46, 418 P.2d at 156, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
84. 28 Cal. App. 3d 361, 104 Cal. Rptr. 566 (1972).
85. Id. at 368-69, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
86. Id. at 369, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
87. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1167, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
88. Id. at 734, 575 P.2d at 1167, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
89. Id. at 735, 738, 742, 575 P.2d at 1167, 1169-70, 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 385,
387, 390.
90. In Rudnick v. Golden West Broadcasters, 156 Cal. App. 3d 793, 798, 202 Cal.
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More recently, the continued viability of the implied assumption
of risk defense9' was explicitly acknowledged and applied in
Ordway v. Superior Court.92 The plaintiff in Ordway was a pro-
fessional jockey who was thrown from her horse and injured as a
Rptr. 900, 903 (1984), Judge Crosby stated that in Li, "the Supreme Court explicitly
noted reasonable assumption of risk involved 'a reduction of defendant's duty of care.'"
Judge Crosby further explained:
Reasonable implied assumption of risk is one of three forms of assumption of risk.
The other two are express assumption of risk . . . . and unreasonable implied
assumption of risk, where plaintiff, by negligent conduct, is held to agree to relieve
defendant of a legal duty. Only the last was affected by Li.
Id. at 798-99, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 903. Judge Crosby made reference to commentators who
have stated that "'a number of fact patterns that look like reasonable implied assumption
of risk may still result in a verdict for defendant [under a system of comparative fault], if
they are recast under the duty concept'" and "'the future relation between assumption of
risk and comparative negligence [in California] ... require[s] the safety valve of "no duty"
for continued recognition of certain isolated instances of reasonable assumption of risk.'"
Id. at 799-800, 202 Cal. Rptr. 672 (emphasis added by court, brackets in original) (cita-
tions omitted).
See also Neinstein v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc., 185 Cal. App. 3d 176, 229 Cal. Rptr.
612 (1986). In Neinstein, the court stated that in situations where the plaintiff has reason-
ably assumed a risk, "his conduct will not be considered as fault under comparative negli-
gence. Rather, the court will decide whether defendant has breached a duty to the plain-
tiff." Id. at 183, 229 Cal. Rptr, at 615-16 (quoting Rudnick, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 797, 202
Cal. Rptr. at 902). The court agreed with the conclusion that the decision to sit in an
unscreened section of a baseball stadium "is neither negligent nor blame-worthy," and
therefore, comparative fault principles do not apply. Id. at 183-84, 229 Cal. Rptr at 616.
In Nelson v. Hall, 165 Cal. App. 3d 709, 211 Cal. Rptr. 688 (1985), the court held that
assumption of risk was a complete bar in the case before it because the plaintiff had rea-
sonably encountered the risk that a dog might bite while being treated. The court reasoned
that "[a] veterinary assistant cannot be deemed to have unreasonably encountered a risk
that is inherent in his or her job. Therefore, this type of assumption of the risk is not
subsumed by comparative fault and, hence, is a complete defense." Id. at 714, 211 Cal.
Rptr. at 672.
The fact that California courts continue to recognize the defense of express assumption
of risk also lends support to the continued existence of implied reasonable assumption of
risk. In cases involving scuba diving, dirt bike racing, motorcross racing, and parachuting,
courts since Li have enforced express waivers of liability so long as the waivers were valid
and did not violate public policy. See Madison v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 589,
250 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1988); Coates v. Newhall Land & Farming, Inc., 191 Cal. App. 3d 1,
236 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1987); McAtee v. Newhall Land & Farming Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d
1031, 216 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1985); Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Center, 168 Cal. App. 3d
333, 214 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1985).
91. See generally Rosenlund, Once a Wicked Sister: The Continuing Role of As-
sumption of Risk Under Comparative Fault in California, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 225 (1986);
Comment, Assumption of the Risk in Alaska after the Adoption of Comparative Negli-
gence, 6 UCLA ALASKA L. REV. 244, 257 (1977); Schwartz, Li v. Yellow Cab Company:
A Survey of California Practice Under Comparative Negligence, 7 PAc. LJ. 747 (1976).
But see Segoviano v. Housing Auth., 143 Cal. App. 3d 162, 170, 191 Cal. Rptr. 598, 584
(1983) (where the plaintiff was injured during a flag football game, the court concluded
that if a plaintiff's conduct in assuming a risk is reasonable, there is still no basis for
barring or reducing plaintiff's recovery); Titus v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 91 Cal. App. 3d
372, 382, 154 Cal. Rptr. 122, 128 (1979) (dicta); Gonzalez v. Garcia, 75 Cal. App. 3d
874, 142 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1977) (dicta).
92. 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1988). Accord, King v. Magnolia
Homeowners Assoc., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1312, 253 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1988).
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result of interference from another horse and jockey during a
race. Plaintiff sued the owner of the offending horse, among
others. The Court of Appeals ordered that summary judgment be
granted in favor of the owner of the offending horse, concluding
that reasonable implied assumption of risk was still a complete
defense, and that it constituted an inferred agreement to relieve a
potential defendant of a duty of care based on the potential plain-
tiff's conduct in encountering a known danger. The court in
Ordway carefully noted the difference between comparative fault
and implied assumption of risk.
The Ordway court recognized that implied assumption of risk
as a mere variant of comparative fault had been merged into com-
parative negligence after Li, but nonetheless rejected the reason-
ing of Segoviano v. Housing Authority,93 stating that "the indi-
vidual who knowingly and voluntarily assumes a risk, whether for
recreational enjoyment, economic reward, or some similar pur-
pose, is deemed to have agreed to reduce the defendant's duty of
care."9 4 The reasonable/unreasonable distinction was recognized
by the Ordway court as an awkward one, which could be more
easily understood as a distinction between "'knowing and intelli-
gent' versus 'negligent or careless.' ,,95
The implied assumption of risk defense is directly applicable to
smoking and health litigation, because plaintiffs and their dece-
dents were well aware of the claimed danger of contracting poten-
tially fatal diseases from smoking cigarettes. When "reasonable"
implied assumption of risk is understood as "knowing and intelli-
gent" as opposed to "negligent or careless,"96 it becomes even
more apparent that assumption of risk should operate as a com-
plete bar to plaintiffs' recovery in smoking and health litigation. 97
To hold otherwise would require the trier of fact to ignore the
common awareness of the widespread claims of adverse health
consequences from smoking, and to conclude that the Labeling
Act warnings failed to adequately apprise consumers of the risks
attributed to smoking.
Plaintiffs' in the pending California smoking and health cases
will clearly not be able to argue plausibly that their diseases, or
93. 143 Cal. App. 3d 162, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1983) (discussed supra note 90).
94. Ordway, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 104, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
95. Id. at 105, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
96. Id.
97. Cf. Sias v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., No. 86-2117, slip op. (6th
Cir, Nov. 22, 1988) (denying social security benefits for vascular diseases allegedly caused
by smoking, reasoning that "[t]he social security act did not repeal the principle of individ-
ual responsibility. Each of us faces myriads of choices in life and the choices we make
whether we like it or not have consequences").
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those of the decendents, were not within the contemplated range
of possibilities of which they had actual knowledge." Plaintiffs'
"synergism" allegation is that a given population group (i.e.,
smokers with high exposure to asbestos fibers) is more likely to
develop lung cancer. Nonetheless, for any individual within that
population group, the possibility of contracting lung cancer is pre-
cisely one of the commonly perceived risks impliedly assumed by
smoking.99 Even if another disease is claimed to have been caused
by smoking, the fact that plaintiff knew of the claims of serious
health risks from smoking should not prevent the operation of the
assumption of risk defense.100
98. Sperling v. Hatch, 10 Cal. App. 3d 54, 61, 88 Cal. Rptr. 704, 709 (1970) (quot-
ing Tavernier v. Maes, 242 Cal. App. 2d 532, 544 (1966)). See also Fuller v. California,
51 Cal. App. 3d 926, 941, 125 Cal. Rptr. 588, 595 (1975) (knowledge of the magnitude of
the risk does not require that the exact nature of the injury be foreseen); Baker v. Chrysler
Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 718, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745, 750 (1976) (quoting Sperling, 10
Cal. App. 3d at 61, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 709).
In Tavernier v. Maes, 242 Cal. App. 2d 532, 534-44, 51 Cal. Rptr. 582, 584 (1966), the
court held that by participating in a softball game, the plaintiff assumed the risk of being
bumped or bruised by bodily contact on a close play. The court reasoned that actual knowl-
edge of the specific danger does not require that the victim foresee the particular accident
and injury which in fact occurred. Rather, "[t]he specificity, particularity, and magnitude
in question must refer to the scope and source of possible dangers .... If the accident and
the resultant injury fall within general hazards ... of which the victim had knowledge he
may be found to have assumed the risk thereof." Id. at 543-44, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 582. But
cf. Vierra v. Fifth Ave. Rental Servs., 60 Cal. 2d 266, 274, 32 P.2d 193, 198, 383 Cal.
Rptr. 777, 782 (1963) (knowledge of danger of flying concrete during construction does not
show knowledge of danger of flying metal caused by defective tool used in the
construction).
A decedent's assumption of risk can be used to bar recovery by his heirs in a wrongful
death case to the same extent as in a personal injury suit. In Coates v. Newhall Land &
Farming, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1, 236 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1987), the court held that a decedent's
express assumption of risk bars recovery by the decedent's heirs in a wrongful death suit.
The court relied on two "California decisions indirectly acknowledging that a decedent's
assumption of the risk implied by conduct may bar a wrongful death action." Id. at 6, 236
Cal. Rptr. at 183-84.
But cf. Rovegno v. San Jose Knights of Columbus Hall Ass'n, 108 Cal. App. 591, 291 P.
848 (1930), where the court stated that the decedent's assumption of risk, "[e]ven though
it might have been available against the decedent had he lived and brought suit for dam-
ages on account of personal injuries, it cannot operate to defeat his mother's independent
statutory right of action given her under the provisions of section 376 .... Id. at 598, 291
P. at 850. In Rovegno, decedent apparently drowned while swimming in defendant's unat-
tended pool. In dicta, the court rejected defendant's argument that decedent, who was a
member of the defendant-association and who was bound by its rules and regulations, as-
sumed the risk.
99. Federal preemption should preclude drawing fine distinctions among consumers
and their awareness of risks, whether based on "synergy," or other personal factors such as
genetic susceptibility or other environmental exposures. See generally Crist & Majoras,
supra note 3.
100. See Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 236 (6th Cir. 1988).
Roysdon involved a claim of vascular disease allegedly caused by smoking and cigarette
"addiction." In affirming a directed verdict for defendant, the court determined that
"whether there was knowledge regarding Mr. Roysdon's specific medical problem is irrele-
vant in light of the serious nature of the other diseases known at that time to be caused by
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B. The Claim of "Addiction" to Tobacco Does Not Avoid the
Assumption of Risk Defense
Plaintiffs' obvious (and perhaps only) response to the implied
assumption of risk defense is to argue that the allegedly "addic-
tive" character of cigarettes affects the "voluntary" nature of
smoking, and therefore precludes an assumption of risk defense.
In other words, plaintiffs seek to avoid personal responsibility for
their choice to smoke by putting in issue the "quality" of the
choice which constitutes the assumption of risk.10' This attempt to
offer an alleged impairment of volition as a legal excuse for per-
sonal choices runs contrary to legal, ethical and social norms of
personal responsibility, and should be rejected.
The American legal system was founded on the twin premises
of free will and individual responsibility. 102 Likewise, California's
constitutional system is grounded on these concepts.' 03 These fun-
damental premises of our legal culture provide the basis for the
normative legal rule that individuals are held accountable for their
actions, when taken with knowledge of the circumstances. Only
extreme circumstances are judged sufficient to release individuals
from legal responsibility for their decisions. For example, in-
sanity-the inability to know what one is doing, or to distinguish
right from wrong-is recognized as a defense to criminal ac-
tions.10 4 Similarly, severe mental retardation has been held to ex-
cuse certain criminal behavior.' 5 Less extreme claims of excuse
for action, such as diminished capacity, irresistible impulse, or
other personality weaknesses or disorders, are not recognized in
California. 0 The irrelevancy of such claims is a matter of funda-
mental social policy; a considered decision to hold individuals gen-
cigarette smoking." Id. at 236. Brisboy v. Fibreboard, 429 Mich. 540, 418 N.W. 2d 650
(1988).
101. The "addiction" argument is legally insufficient to defeat the preemptive effect
of the Labeling Act on product liability claims, and should also be found insufficient on
preemption grounds to negate the assumption of risk defense. See Crist & Majoras, supra
note 3, at 598-601. But cf. Garne, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest
Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423 (1980) (arguing for "addiction" as the central theory in
the "new wave" of smoking and health litigation).
102. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)
(noting that "the basic concept of our system [is] that legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility").
103. E.g., CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 1 ("All people are by nature free and independent..
104. People v. Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d 765, 771, 704 P.2d 752, 755, 217 Cal. Rptr. 685,
688 (1985).
105. See In re Ramon M., 22 Cal. 3d 419, 428, 584 P.2d 524, 530, 149 Cal. Rptr.
387, 393 (1978).
106. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25, 28 (Deering 1985).
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erally responsible for their knowing actions."7
Individual personality traits are simply not recognized as rele-
vant legal excuses.10 8 Thus, an irritable person cannot raise his
personality as a defense to civil assault. A prevaricating individual
cannot defend on that basis against a charge of defamation or per-
jury. And a greedy individual cannot avoid liability for embezzle-
ment by virtue of his nature.
Courts previously have excluded so-called "addiction" evidence
where such evidence did not amount to insanity or incompetence.
For example, in Powell v. Texas, 0 9 a public drunkenness prosecu-
tion, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision to
prohibit testimony regarding the defendant's chronic alcoholism
that supposedly made him an "involuntary drinker."110 Citing
"[t]raditional common-law concepts of personal accountability,"
the Court found it impossible to draw legally meaningful "distinc-
tions between a 'compulsion' . . . and an 'impulse.' "
It is one thing to say that if a man is deprived of alcohol his
hands will begin to shake, he will suffer agonizing pains and ul-
timately he will have hallucinations; it is quite another to say
that a man has a "compulsion" to take a drink, but that he also
retains a certain amount of "free will" with which to resist. It is
simply impossible, in the present state of our knowledge, to
ascribe a useful meaning to the latter concept. This definitional
confusion reflects, of course, not merely the undeveloped state of
the psychiatric art but also the conceptual difficulties inevitably
attendant upon the importation of scientific and medical models
into a legal system generally predicated upon a different set of
assumptions."'
Soon after Powell, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia ruled en banc that evidence of alleged addic-
tion to narcotics should be excluded from a trial for possession of
107. See id. § 28(b). "As a matter of public policy there shall be no defense of
diminished capacity, diminished responsibility, or irresistible impulse ......
108. Although such alleged disorders may arouse sympathy and be deserving of hu-
mane psychological treatment, they cannot serve as excuses for avoiding legal responsibil-
ity. As the U.S. Supreme Court recently noted in the related context of allegedly involun-
tary confessions, an individual's "perception of coercion flowing from [a mental disorder],
however important or significant such a perception may be in other disciplines, is a matter"
outside the governing legal constraints. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170-71 (1986).
The Court held that a person who confessed due to an alleged psychological compulsion,
but who was otherwise competent, could not avoid the consequences of his confession. Ab-
sent coercion, "voluntariness is irrelevant to the presence or absence of the elements of a
crime ...... Id. at 168. See also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985)
("[v]oluntariness ... has always had a uniquely legal dimension").
109. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
110. Id. at 518.
I 11. Id. at 526, 535.
112. Id. at 526.
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heroin.'13 More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit ruled that evidence of "pathological gambling"
should be excluded from an embezzlement prosecution.114 Unless
the defendant could produce evidence amounting to an insanity
defense, his proffer of evidence showing only a pathological inabil-
ity to control his need for money was insufficient.1 5
Identically, an alleged tobacco "addict"'" 6 should not be able to
raise that "disorder" as a defense to personal responsibilities for
his choices. The fact is that over forty million Americans in the
last two decades have decided to quit smoking despite the alleg-
edly "addictive" nature of tobacco. Even if the excuse of tobacco
"addiction" was deemed relevant to an assumption of risk defense,
there are grave scientific difficulties with claims that tobacco "ad-
diction" or "tobacco dependency" rendered a plaintiff unable to
exercise volition. In order to prove this assertion, plaintiffs must
show that it can be scientifically ascertained whether a person is
unable to stop smoking, and that plaintiff meets the applicable
criteria. Neither burden can be met.
Historically, the standard for admissibility of novel scientific ev-
idence has been the one set out in Frye v. United States:"'
"courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs."" 8 The Frye standard has been adopted in California,
and requires "a preliminary showing of general acceptance of the
113. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1147-48 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 980 (1973). "[P]sychic dependence, and a claim of psychic incapacity, [does] not
establish a defense under settled judicial doctrine .... 486 F.2d at 1178 (Leventhal, J.,
concurring).
114. United States v. Lewellyn, 723 F.2d 615, 619-20 (8th Cir. 1983).
115. Id. Significantly, the Eighth Circuit found it immaterial in Lewellyn that patho-
logical gambling was added, as was the tobacco disorder (see infra note 131), as a "disor-
der of impulse control" to DSM-III in 1980. THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION'S
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) (DSM-III).
723 F.2d at 618. The court emphasized the introductory disclaimer in DSM-II that "[t]he
purpose of DSM-lll is to provide clear descriptions of diagnostic categories .... The use
of this manual for nonclinical purposes, such as the determination of legal responsibility..
. must be critically examined in each instance .... " Id. at 618 (quoting DSM-III). The
Eighth Circuit found DSM-lI to be of no aid in the context of legal responsibility for one's
acts. See also United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 930 (1984) (addiction, "voluntary or involuntary," can provide no defense to criminal
charges of any kind).
116. DSM Ill added a diagnosis for the disorder of "tobacco dependency" in 1980.
DSM-111 at 176. This disorder was not recognized in DSM-II (1968), and its description
was revised this year. Thus the validity of the DSM-III description is far from well-ac-
cepted. Moreover, the 1987 revision of the DSM-III itself never uses the term "addiction."
117. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
118. Id. at 1014.
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new technique in the relevant scientific community." 119 The psy-
chological evidence of "addiction" to smoking which plaintiffs will
doubtless seek to present is subject to the Frye standard. 20
Whether experts are able even to diagnose mental disorders has
been seriously questioned by the Supreme Court of California:
"'[m]ental illness' is generally acknowledged to be a vague and
uncertain concept. Categories of mental diseases are notoriously
unclear, often overlap, and frequently change. The experts them-
selves often disagree on what is an appropriate diagnosis.''
Even if an initial diagnosis can be made, the problem of pre-
dicting the consequences of a mental "disorder" is one that has
likewise been expressly noted by the California Supreme Court:
"[It] must be conceded that psychiatrists still experience consider-
able difficulty in confidently and accurately diagnosing mental ill-
ness. Yet those difficulties are multiplied manyfold when psychia-
trists venture from diagnosis to prognosis and undertake to predict
the consequences of such illness ... "122 In Tarasoff v. Regents of
the University of California,2 3 the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, joined by several other mental health organizations, filed an
amicus brief which asserted that mental health professionals are
unable to reliably predict future violent behavior. The court noted
that: "[t] herapists, in the present state of the art, are unable relia-
bly to predict violent acts; their forecasts, amicus claims, tend
consistently to overpredict violence, and indeed are more often
wrong than right.' 24
The essence of plaintiff's "addiction" claims are that habitual
use of tobacco so overbears one's free will that a smoker is unable
to stop smoking. However, as demonstrated supra, it is clear that
the concept of "addiction" and its relation to individual choice or
free will has no accepted scientific meaning. The scientific princi-
ple involved here-that "addiction" to cigarettes robs smokers of
free choice-has not been shown to be either reliable or valid.
Professor Herbert Fingarette, in an exhaustive review of the liter-
ature on the effect of "addiction" on voluntary behavior, con-
119. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144,
148 (1976).
120. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 53, 723 P.2d 1354, 1374, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
264 (1982). "[W]e do not doubt that if testimony based on a new scientific process operat-
ing on purely psychological evidence were to be offered in our courts, it would likewise be
subjected to the Frye standard of admissibility."
121. Conservatorship of Roulet, 23 Cal. 3d 219, 234, 590 P.2d 1, 10, 152 Cal. Rptr.
243, 264 (1979) (footnote omitted).
122. People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 326, 535 P.2d 352, 365, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488,
501 (1975) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
123. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 13 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
124. Id. at 437-38, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24 (footnote omitted).
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cluded: "[T] here is no generally accepted scientific explanation of
addiction, and perforce no scientific basis for establishing that
addictive behavior is generally involuntary. "125
The problem of predicting the consequences of mental disorders
is especially vexing in the context of evaluating a person's capacity
to exercise personal choice. Plaintiffs cannot show "general agree-
ment" in the relevant scientific community that it can be scientifi-
cally determined whether a person's capacity for self-control is so
impaired that he is unable to quit smoking. In the absence of such
a showing, scientific evidence regarding the "addictive" nature of
cigarette smoking does not even meet the standards for admis-
sability under the Frye test, let alone defeat the implied assump-
tion of risk defense.' 26
IV. RECENT TRIALS IN SMOKING AND HEALTH CASES
During the "new wave" of smoking and health litigation, only
five cases have gone to trial. This number is dwarfed by the num-
ber of voluntary and involuntary dismissals. Two of the "new
wave" cases, Galbraith and Roysdon, were tried in 1985 and have
been discussed elsewhere, including the Tennessee Article. No cig-
arette cases were tried in 1986 or 1987, but three were tried in
1988. In approximate chronological order, these three were Hor-
ton, 2 7 Cipollone,28 and Girton.'29 As discussed more fully below,
125. Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, 84 YALE L.J. 413, 433-34
(1975) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
126. In a major study analyzing the application of DSM-III criteria for tobacco de-
pendence the authors noted that "we know of no tests of the validity of the DSM-III defini-
tion of tobacco dependence." Hughes, Hatsukami, Mitchell & Dahigren, Prevalence of
Tobacco Dependence and Withdrawal, presented at the 47th annual meeting of the Com-
mittee on Problems of Drug Dependence in Baltimore, MD June 1984. AM J. PSYCHIATRY.
When the authors tested these criteria, they found the definition to be "over-inclusive and
thus may lack diagnostic discriminability." The authors concluded that "[t]his result sug-
gests the DSM-111 definition for tobacco dependence needs to be reformulated." According
to a recent article, published before the revision of DSM-III, the sections in DSM III-R
dealing with "substance use disorders" (including tobacco dependence) were to be
"changed substantially." Rounsaville, Kosten, Williams & Spitzer, A Field Trial of DSM
JII-R Psychoactive Substance Dependence Disorders, 144 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 351-55
(1987). The authors of this study stated that, "field-testing [of the new criteria] was essen-
tial for the section on psychoactive substance use disorders because of the major revisions
that have been made." Id. at 351. However, "tobacco dependence" was not included in the
field trial; therefore, no studies of the "substantially" revised criteria for tobacco depen-
dence have been conducted, and no evidence of the reliability of these criteria are available.
See id. at 352. Cf. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVS.. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, NICOTINE ADDICTION: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL (1988) (concluding that "[c]areful examination of the data makes it clear that
cigarette and other forms of tobacco are addicting"). But cf Crist & Majoras, supra note
3, at 596-98 (arguing against an "addiction" classification for tobacco).
127. Horton v. American Tobacco Co., (Holmes County, Miss. 1988) (unreported
case).
128. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 83-2864 (D.N.J. June 13, 1988).
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Horton led to a hung jury and mistrial; Cipollone led to a mixed
verdict, completely vindicating two of the three tobacco defend-
ants; and Girton resulted in an unambiguous defense verdict.
Because the casts of players and the applicable law, at least as
applied in these cases, of the three jurisdictions (Mississippi, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania), varied so significantly, it is difficult to
draw any unifying legal conclusions, or to extrapolate those con-
clusions to California. On the other hand, it is clear that during
jury deliberations fundamental notions of personal choice and per-
sonal responsibility were unremitting obstacles to plaintiffs.
A. Horton v. American Tobacco Company
Because no opinion was issued in Horton, any after the fact
analysis of the court's reasoning is difficult. The trial court
granted defendant's Restatement section 402A comment i motion,
dismissing plaintiffs' strict liability claim. This ruling is particu-
larly noteworthy because it rejected plaintiffs' arguments that cig-
arettes containing additives and trace amounts of residues of agri-
cultural chemicals are "contaminated" within the meaning of
comment i. Relying on plaintiffs' decedent's testimony that adver-
tising was irrelevant to him, the court rejected every effort by
plaintiffs to circumvent that admission. At the conclusion of the
month-long trial, the jury was charged on plaintiffs' breach of im-
plied warranty and negligent design claims. The instructions spe-
cifically referenced plaintiffs' additive and agricultural chemical
residue "contamination" claims, and a requirement that such
"contaminants" caused Horton's injuries. 130 The jurors were also
charged under Mississippi's law of "pure" comparative negligence,
which would have permitted plaintiffs to recover something even if
their decedent had been found ninety-nine percent responsible for
his own injury. No assumption of risk defense is allowed in Mis-
sissippi. The jury was, however, unable to reach a verdict, and a
mistrial was declared.
A variety of post-trial motions for permission to file interlocu-
tory appeals, including an appeal of the preemption ruling, were
denied by the Mississippi Supreme Court. Resolution of the sub-
stantive issues must thus await a retrial, which may be scheduled
129. Girton v. American Tobacco Co., sub nom. Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674 F.
Supp. 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
130. See Horton jury charge: "and further find that such Pall Mall cigarettes were
not wholesome and fit for smoking because they contained contaminants such as pesticide
residues, poisons, toxic agents or carcinogens other than those naturally found in tobacco..
. and if you further believe that such contaminants, if any, were in themselves a contribut-
ing proximate cause .... "
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in 1989.
B. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
A comprehensive review of Cipollone is not possible within the
remaining pages of this Article. The case has already generated
more than twenty-five published opinions; most were by the dis-
trict court, but three came on interlocutory appeals to the Third
Circuit. In addition, two petitions for certiorari were submitted to
but denied by the United States Supreme Court. Nor has the final
chapter been written, for all parties have appealed to the Third
Circuit.
Cipollone is, of course, best known for its preemption decisions.
The Third Circuit's opinion was discussed above, as were certain
aspects of the district court's decision on remand, which grudg-
ingly applied the Third Circuit's opinion to dismiss many of plain-
tiff's post-1965 claims. However, Cipollone is also noteworthy in
several other respects. Ignoring certain New Jersey and Third Cir-
cuit precedents (construing New Jersey law) to the contrary, the
district court speculated pursuant to Erie' that a claim based on
a generic risk-utility test was available under New Jersey law even
though no alternative "safe" design was alleged. Although the dis-
trict court held that such a claim was viable, that conclusion sub-
sequently was rejected by the New Jersey legislature which, like
California, adopted a comment i statute. Thereafter, the district
court gave effect to the legislative determinations.
Trial commenced in early February 1988 and concluded ap-
proximately four months later. Already truncated by the preemp-
tion and comment i rulings noted above, plaintiff's case was fur-
ther narrowed by the district court's ruling on defendants' motion
for directed verdicts. Despite unnecessary and antagonistic rheto-
ric, the court dismissed (1) plaintiff's pre-1966 failure to warn and
breach of warranty claims against Lorillard and Philip Morris
(whose cigarette brands had not been used by plaintiff's decedent
until after 1966), (2) plaintiff's claims of negligent failure to re-
search and test against all defendants, and (3) plaintiff's claim of
failure to market an allegedly "safer" cigarette against Liggett."3 2
The jury returned a mixed verdict, finding in favor of defend-
ants Lorillard and Philip Morris, rejecting (as against them and
Liggett) plaintiff's claims of pre-1966 fraud and civil conspiracy.
The jury also found that although Liggett's failure to warn pre-
1966 was a proximate cause of plaintiff's decedent's death, she
131. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
132. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1988).
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had assumed the risk and thus was eighty percent responsible for
her own injuries. Accordingly, under New Jersey's law of compar-
ative negligence, she was barred from recovery on her negligent
and strict liability failure to warn claims. The jury also found that
Liggett had breached an express warranty; although it awarded
plaintiff $400,000, it awarded Rose Cipollone's estate nothing.
The verdict on the express warranty claim defies logic until the
district court's instructions are considered. Specifically, the court
eliminated from its instructions any requirement that the alleged
warranty must be found to be a part of the basis of the bargain,
i.e., that reliance must be shown (or at least that any presumed
reliance not be disproved). The instructions similarly foreclosed
any other means by which plaintiff's decedent's assumption of the
risk could be factored in as a defense to the express warranty
claim. The court later justified its instruction, stating that it con-
cluded "that a buyer's reliance on an affirmation or promise is
irrelevant to a determination of whether that statement 'becomes
part of the basis of the bargain.' "133
Apart from the fact that this view turns the law of warranty on
its head, what is most remarkable is that approximately a month
before, the same court in the same case had reached precisely the
opposite conclusion. Thus, in its directed verdict decision, the dis-
trict court had written: "[w]hether such affirmations, once made,
are part of the basis of the bargain is a question of fact for the
jury. ' 131 Inexplicably, that question of fact was not submitted to
the jury.
Although Cipollone is now on appeal, it is not too early to begin
to assess its implications. First, although it was heralded as the
strongest test against the industry, Cipollone confirmed jurors' un-
willingness to award damages to a smoker for conscious lifestyle
choices. Second, the mixed verdict provides no encouragement for
other plaintiffs because it did not begin to cover plaintiff's coun-
sel's published estimates of out-of-pocket expenses. Indeed, there
have been very few new cases filed since Cipollone, while a much
larger number of cases have been dismissed. Third, the verdict
against Liggett, which could well be reversed on appeal, has fo-
cused additional attention on the irrationality of this kind of
litigation. 35
133. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 83-2864, slip op. at 9 (D.N.J. Aug. 24,
1988) (denying motions for new trial and JNOV).
134. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1497 (D.N.J. Apr. 21,
1988).
135. Some of the Cipollone jurors have even publicly expressed both regret about the
award and hope that it will be reversed on appeal. THE Am. LAW., Sept. 1988, at 31-37.
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C. Girton v. American Tobacco Company
Girton is the most recent of the cigarette cases to be tried, but
the first in which a claim of a synergistic interaction between
smoking and asbestos was at issue. The case was filed by John
Gunsalus (who died before trial, resulting in the substitution of
Girton as executor) in federal court in Philadelphia against six-
teen asbestos manufacturers, the Tobacco Institute, and The
American Tobacco Company (American). On November 24,
1987, the Tobacco Institute's motion for summary judgment was
granted, and American's motion for summary judgment was
granted in part and denied in part. 36 Plaintiff dismissed or settled
with all of the asbestos defendants prior to trial.
Apart from its disposition of some novel claims, the opinion is
interesting on several issues akin to those raised in the California
cases. Specifically, the court held, relying on comment i to Section
402A, that "plaintiff may not recover from defendant American
Tobacco Company for injuries caused by the inherent dangers of
cigarette smoking without showing a defect," and that "[t]he only
cognizable defect asserted by plaintiff is the failure adequately to
warn of the dangers of cigarette smoking.' 13 7 The court also dis-
missed plaintiffs risk-utility claim because Pennsylvania had not
adopted that theory of liability,' and because "[w]hether prod-
ucts should be banned or whether absolute liability should be im-
posed for their use are determinations more appropriately made
by the legislative branch of government."' 39 Finally, the court dis-
missed plaintiff's misrepresentation claim (its analysis would have
been applicable to the time-barred express warranty claim) be-
cause, in addition to the fact that the advertisements at issue
"probably were not representations of fact as a matter of law,"
they were "not the kind of representations upon which reasonable
people would rely"140 in evaluating safety because they related to
mildness and enjoyment, and "these alleged representations lack
sufficient causal nexus to the harm of which plaintiff
complains."''
Thus, after applying preemption, the only issue was whether
136. Girton v. American Tobacco Co., sub nom. Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674 F.
Supp. 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
137. Id. at 1158.
138. Accord Miller v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 679 F. Supp. 485 (E.D.
Pa. 1988), affd, 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988).
139. Gunsalus, 674 F. Supp. at 1159. See Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F.
Supp. 1206, 1208 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (similar analysis in handgun case).
140. Compare this ruling with the preceding discussion of the warranty claim in
Cipollone.
141. Gunsalus, 674 F. Supp. at 1160.
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American was liable in negligence or strict liability for a pre-1966
failure to warn. After trial, on the sole issue of strict liability/
failure to warn which included presentation of testimony on "ad-
diction" and the "information environment," the jury found that
although American had failed to warn pre-1966, that failure did
not proximately cause plaintiff's decedent's injury and death. Ac-
cordingly, a defense verdict was entered.
It is difficult to determine the specific basis for the jury's con-
clusion that there was no proximate cause. Each of the proximate
cause problems discussed in this Article were raised during trial,
and each is sufficient in and of itself to explain the jury's finding.
It is not difficult to determine, however, that the jury flatly re-
jected plaintiff's effort to argue that "addiction" somehow excused
the smoker's lifestyle choices.
CONCLUSION
The interpretation of Civil Code Section 1714.45 by the appel-
late court in American Tobacco Co. should definitively conclude
the "new wave" of smoking and health litigation in California. It
is expected that the combination of preemption, comment i, as-
sumption of risk and the fundamental moral sense of jurors re-
garding personal choice and responsibility should eventually put
an end to the faltering "new wave" in other jurisdictions as well.
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